Friday, December 30, 2011

Hans Stockton博士對台灣2012年1月14日選舉之分析

Part 1: Taiwan’s Presidential Race down to the Wire: What will Mean the Difference?

Six months ago, the 2012 general election on Taiwan looked like a fairly sure, if not highly competitive, two-party race between the incumbent president Dr. Ma Ing-jeou and his challenger from the Democratic Progressive Party, Dr. Tsai Ing-wen. Although local and legislative bi- elections signaled some rise in voter discontent with the KMT since its landslide victories in 2008, it appeared that a Ma victory in 2012 would also signal continued KMT dominance in the legislative yuan as well. What a difference, however, does six months make.

Starting with what was likely a 10-point advantage over Tsai Ing-wen in a two-candidate race, the Ma campaign has suffered several key stumbling blocks that have now reduced his incumbency advantage to nearly zero. First, the ill-received announcement of his consideration of a peace treaty with Beijing was perceived by many moderate voters as going too far, too soon and was seemingly made without regard to survey data that continues to indicate some hesitance among the general population that the pace of cross-strait relations was a bit too fast. Clearly, also, the suggestion of a peace treaty raised questions about Taiwan’s status in such a treaty and none believed that Beijing would negotiate with Taipei in recognition of its sovereignty. Also, Tsai has found support for her calls to “democratize” future expansion of cross-strait links by promising more transparency and accountability in future dealings with the mainland. Secondly, the initially minor incident of the “piggy bank” donations to the Tsai campaign became a major rallying point for the DPP grass roots campaign. As well, the manner in which the KMT attempted to frame the initial incident as a campaign violation and the DPP’s effort to exploit children backfired as being a bit draconian. Third, the most recent effort by the KMT to cast shadows on the Tsai campaign has been the charge of Dr. Tsai’s impropriety in the Yu Chang case. While the potential for some impropriety deserves consideration and proper investigation, the alteration of key documents presented by the KMT has cast doubt on the validity of the very charge and the effort to tarnish Tsai’s ethics has largely backfired. Fourth, and perhaps the biggest shock, was Mr. James Soong’s entry into the race. Mr. Soong’s entry not only poses the real possibility of siphoning blue votes from KMT, but also signaled the revival of the People First Party in the legislative races. PFP candidates have registered to compete in ten district races as well as the national at-large constituency.

Of the four points above, which matters most in the election outcome? The first three have bolstered Tsai’s support among green voters and energized her campaign in a way that should attract a strong green supporter turn-out. What is most important here is whether her campaign will mobilize the 2-3% of “dark green” voters that essentially dropped out of 2008 elections due to disillusionment with the DPP’s corruption tainted record. Additionally, the DPP lost moderate and light-green voters in 2008 as a result of “exhaustion” from the identity agenda of the Chen administration. By not elevating the identity issue to the fore as in past elections, Dr. Tsai is likely to bring another 2-3% of moderate voters back to the party. In the minds of some non- committed voters, the KMT’s actions have been perceived as mean-spirited and disingenuine, and this, combined with other variables, will likely increase Tsai’s support among moderate
and “light blue” voters. These are marginal effects compared to Mr. Soong’s entry into the race, and Mr. Soong’s success or failure is largely where the election outcome hinges. A strong showing by Mr. Soong will siphon more votes away from the KMT than from the DPP, and this is the crux of the result.

While the “1992 Consensus” continues to be a constant source of contention, the larger issue of identity has taken a back seat in the past month, because previous tests by both candidates have failed to incite the same voter passions as in past elections. This marks a change in the campaigning of the DPP, with the Tsai campaign capitalizing on the KMT’s own mistakes and making concerted efforts to promote policy issues related more to the daily lives of Taiwan’s people and the fear of growing income inequity. Avoiding the turbulent issue of identity, success with a grass-roots campaign, and capitalizing on KMT missteps have bolstered Tsai’s chances.

Without a doubt, Taiwan’s overall economy is in much better shape than at the close of 2008 and 2009 and the Ma administration has taken credit. However, the lofty campaign goals of Mr. Ma’s 6-6-3 promises have failed to take shape and the DPP has successfully pushed the question of income inequity and under-employment of young workers to the fore. ECFA, and related agreements with Beijing, have generated new markets, inbound tourism, and reduced overt military tensions between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. However, uncertainty about the long-term economic impacts and the pace of rapprochement continue to detract somewhat from these successes. These speak to committed blue voters, but do not necessarily secure the support of undecided and light green voters.

It seems that the DPP is utilizing a form of kung fu that uses the opponent’s strength against him. Rather than seek a “killing blow,” the Tsai campaign has been quite successful in not just deflecting attacks by the KMT, but turning these against the incumbent, such as in the “piggy bank” and Yu Chang episodes. Even efforts by the Ma campaign to attach the Chen Shui- bian stigma to Tsai have failed to gain momentum. Dr. Tsai’s best defense has been the simple statement, “I am not Chen.”

So, how can we quantify this story to begin to shape some sort of election forecast? For starters, Tsai has to make up a 17% point difference from the 2008 election in order to win. In a two- candidate race, this lead is not as large as it might seem, because only 8.5% of voters would have to switch from KMT to DPP support. However, a 3-candidate race makes the scenario much more difficult. Current surveys show support for Mr. Soong at about 10%. Based on the 2008 results, this would reduce Ma’s support from 58.45% to 48.45% against the DPP’s 41.55%; a gap of about 6% to overcome when including about 1% of total votes cast that are nullified as invalid based on past elections. This equates to about 650,000 votes that Tsai needs to pick up for victory. A major assumption here is that the lion’s share of votes going to Mr. Soong will come from past KMT voters and not siphon off significant DPP support from Dr. Tsai.

If Tsai increases the DPP vote by 5% points, this would result in 46.5% of the popular vote. If Soong received 10% of the vote, then this would result in 43.5% of the vote going to President Ma. So, the key for Tsai is increasing her vote share by from 5 – 6% percent. From where will these votes come – revived “dark green” voters; first-time voters; and a slightly larger share of moderate or non-committed voters.

If about 2% of all Taiwan voters that are “dark green” failed to vote in 2008 for the reasons stated above, and exercise their vote in 2012, this adds about 262,079 votes to the DPP total. If 50% of the approximately one million first-time voters actually vote, and 60% vote for DPP (as indicated in surveys), then this adds another 100,000 votes to the DPP quota. This results in a total vote pick-up of 362, 079 of the necessary 650,000 needed. This leaves a remainder of 287,921 votes that Dr. Tsai has to generate from the pool of voters that cast their ballots for Dr. Ma in 2012 or 2.2% of all those having voted in the last election. We will find out in two weeks if Dr. Tsai’s efforts have been sufficient to generate this shift.

There is a common expression in the United States, “When given lemons, make lemonade.” Essentially, this means that faced with challenges, do your best to create good outcomes. The Ma campaign has sought to present the Taiwan voter as much lemonade as possible. The Tsai campaign, however, has been pretty successful at turning that lemonade back into lemons in the minds of many undecided voters.

We should not forget the landlside victory of the KMT in 2008 and just how many votes the KMT can afford to lose and still come out on top in 2012. Mr. Ma won with a 17% point victory over Mr. Hsieh and his party captured a super majority of seats in the Legislative Yuan. None of the issues above are “terminal” to the KMT or guarantees of success for the DPP. The DPP will have to cobble together large bits and pieces of support across the island. The party must significantly increase its vote share in the most populated northern and central areas Taipei City, New Taipei City, Taoyuan County, and Taichung. With two weeks to go before January 14, the election is barely Mr. Ma’s to lose, but this is tenuous.
Lest we forget, this year marks the first combined presidential and legislative election. While most of the attention has been focused on the presidential race, the outcome of elections for Taiwan’s legislative branch will determine how smoothly the next administration will be able to pursue its agenda. Although the DPP recovered lost ground in bi-elections after 2008, the KMT still holds 65% of all legislative seats. With a rise in support for the DPP and the entry of the PFP in the race, what are the prospects for the balance of legislative power? Will the presidential victor face an opposition legislative majority or will Taiwan continue with another four years of unified power between the executive and legislative branches? These scenarios will be presented in part two of this essay.

This project was conducted with the gracious research assistance of Ms. Ching-Hsuan (Christine) Meng (孟慶萱).

Hans Stockton (史漢傑), PhD, is the director of the Center for International Studies and
the Cullen Trust for Higher Education/Fayez Sarofim Endowed Chair in International Studies at the University of St. Thomas in Houston, Texas. He has studied Taiwan’s politics for more than twenty years and has observed every national election on Taiwan since 1992. He will be a member of an international delegation of election observers in Taiwan for the upcoming election.

Part II: Projecting Possible Outcomes for the 2012 8th Legislative Election

Thus far, attention to Taiwan’s legislative races has taken a backseat to the hotly contested presidential race. Clearly, the single most important political position in Taiwan is the head of state, but that head of state – whether it be Dr. Ma Ing-jeou or Dr. Tsai Ing-wen - must heavily rely on the legislative body to put into motion their respective party platforms. The 2008 landslide victory of the KMT created a single party government not seen since the pre- democracy days, and this has given President Ma the space to pursue his agenda with little parliamentary opposition. Coming out of the 2008 parliamentary ballot, the KMT won a super majority of seats (71.7%). Combined with allied parties, the blue camp controlled more than 75% of the seats, reducing the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to a mere opposition shadow at just under 24% of seats.

Since January 2008, there have been eleven legislative bi-elections to fill vacated seats. The DPP won seven of these races, six of which were against KMT incumbents. The KMT retained its control of three districts, while losing one incumbent seat to a KMT maverick in Miaoli County. In three of the eight bi-election defeats, KMT mavericks cost the KMT the margin of victory, a reminder that party unity continues to be key to KMT victory, while party splinters and mavericks create room for DPP victories. Many speculated that these defeats were a popular renunciation of either the size of the KMT majority and/or growing unease with President Ma’s handling of domestic crises and cross-strait relations. While the subsequent Big-5 elections resulted in a record overall percentage of votes for the DPP, the KMT won three of the five large municipality elections. Taken together, bi-elections and local elections demonstrated growing momentum for the DPP. Under the new winner-take-all legislative election rules, however, the KMT and blue party allies still enter 2012 with a disproportionate advantage in district races.

What are the conditions that may reshape the legislative balance of power in Taiwan’s parliament after January 14th? What are the incremental changes in vote share that could make a difference in this electoral outcome? I first look at the district races and then the national at- large list seats.

The simple answer is that a major political earthquake would be required for the KMT to lose its legislative majority, and the appeal of Dr. Tsai as the DPP chairwoman and presidential candidate would need to filter down to the legislative races to increase turn-out by green party supporters, as well as capture several percentage points of support from the moderate and/or undecided voters. This, combined with division within the blue camp brought on by the re- emergence of the People First Party and a handful of KMT mavericks, will certainly close the gap, but it is unlikely to change majority parties in the legislative yuan. One particular advantage of the DPP is that there is no other party competing for green votes at the district level. Thus unity in the green camp strengthens the DPP’s chances against the larger, but divided, block of blue supporters.

Since this is the first simultaneous presidential and legislative election, there is uncertainty about how this may influence both turn-out and voting decisions by Taiwan’s public. The 2008 legislative election turn-out was a low, 58.5% while three months later, the presidential election turn-out was 76.3%. Turn-out in January 2012 will again approach 76% plus, and the million dollar question is which party’s supporters will turn out in greater numbers than in the past. Based on the abysmal showing for the DPP in the 2008 elections as a renunciation of the Chen era, one could surmise that a larger percentage of green party supporters simply stayed home than the non-voting blue camp supporters. An influx of green voters will not only bolster Dr. Tsai’s chances in the presidential race, but also her party’s chances in the legislature.
In order to forecast possible results of the 2012 legislative election, I look at the legislative votes from 2004, 2008, and subsequent bi-elections to gauge past support for each party. For the 2004 results, I re-allocate votes under the old electoral system according to the rules of the current system. This process yielded an 88% success rate at predicting the party victors at the district level prior to the 2008 legislative election, revealing a KMT landslide victory months before the 2008 polls. I then calculate the victory margins in each district race. After identifying which parties are running candidates in each of the 73 district races, I determine which districts are most and least prone to a change in party representation given 5, 10, and greater than 10 percentage point change in support. Certainly, changes in party support will not be constant across all districts, but in order to keep the model simple and reduce errors introduced by “speculating” on each individual district, a single standard is applied with each test.

There are four crucial assumptions underlying this modeling that may very well prove to be false. The first assumption is that the DPP will hold onto all of its current seats. This is potentially problematic in Taitung County and Taoyuan County #3, where the DPP margin of victory in post-2008 bi-elections was extremely close in very blue districts. The second assumption is that the success of Dr. Tsai’s presidential campaign will spill over into similar rises in support for DPP legislative candidates. Recent reports from Taiwan indicate far more DPP candidates seeking to ride Dr. Tsai’s coattails than KMT candidates relying on those of President Ma. The third important assumption is that PFP candidates will siphon KMT votes on a larger scale than those from the DPP. A fourth assumption bars the last minute revelation of a major scandal or actions of an external party that would reshape popular sentiments at the “12th hour.”

At lower levels of change in voter choice, the outcomes are not very dramatic. If the DPP increases its vote share by at least 5% in all districts, this would result in the KMT losing seats in Changhua County #4, New Taipei City #4, and Kaohsiung City #7 and #8. The NPSU is likely to hold onto its three seats, although Kinmen and Penghu counties will be hotly contested with the possibility of a PFP victory in Kinmen. Other parties and independent candidates are most likely to again be shut out of 2012. So, with a 5% point shift in votes island-wide, the legislative balance would be slightly adjusted to the KMT with 47 district seats, DPP with 23 seats, NPSU holding onto 3 seats, and one PFP seat. The KMT could retain its two-thirds majority with incumbent victories in the aboriginal constituencies and 15 at-large seats.

The next scenario is one in which there is a shift of between 5 and 10 percentage points in favor of the DPP. This scenario introduces some interesting alternative outcomes. In addition to the potential losses above, the KMT would be in jeopardy of losing eight additional seats: Chiayi City #1, Nantou County #2, Hualien County, Taitung County #1, Taipei City #2, Taipei City #6, New Taipei City #5, Kaohsiung City #1, and Kaohsiung City #6. The results in Taipei City #6 will be a function of the presence and influence of a PFP candidate and blue mavericks that will reduce KMT support.

Should the KMT lose the four seats above and these eight seats, its district share of seats would drop to thirty-eight. This would require an additional nineteen seats from the at-large list and aboriginal constituencies to retain majority status. If the PFP and NPSU win four district seats, two aboriginal seats, and no at-large seats, this would require a minimum of 13 at-large seats or about 40% of the at-large party list vote. The KMT would most likely hold onto its single party majority, but at the extreme, a 5-10 percentage point shift away from the KMT nation- wide could result in no majority party in the legislature and force the KMT plurality to work

in coalition with its blue party allies once again. With the acrimony generated by Mr. Soong’s campaign, it is not entirely clear how well the PFP would work within such a coalition.

Finally, there are a number of electoral districts in which a sufficient rise in DPP support, combined with a fragmented blue vote due to PFP candidates, could produce the most extreme, yet unlikely, outcomes. The true combined tests of Dr. Tsai’s coattails and Mr. Soong’s currency, come in some of the most hostile environments for the DPP: Nantou County #2, Taichung City #6 and #8, New Taipei City #2 and #7, and Kaohsiung City #3. If the DPP were to increase its vote share by 10 percentage points, while PFP candidates siphon as many as 7-9% points from the KMT, the DPP could pick up these districts as well. PFP candidates are running in four of these districts.

As stated above, the odds of DPP success are not very strong in this last group of districts, but these are likely the district races that will be the KMT’s last line of defense for holding its majority status. If the results modeled above bear out, the DPP would need to win three of these six very difficult races to obtain a 35 seat to 35 seat balance of power in the legislative yuan. This would require the KMT to obtain twenty-two additional seats from coalition partners, the at-large list and aboriginal constituencies. On the other hand, this would also require the DPP to obtain twenty-two additional seats from the at-large list (assuming it wins no aboriginal seats) and/or join in coalition with another party. For all practical purposes, it is currently improbable that the DPP would capture 65% of the at-large vote. Contemplating a DPP-PFP coalition strikes one as equally improbable. Barring the PFP simply returning once again to the KMT fold, the outcome of this extreme scenario would signal the collapse of the party system as we have known it in Taiwan and generate considerable uncertainty due to the new coalition politics.

Pulling the thread one last extreme time, should the DPP win in all six of these races, or compensate with surprise victories elsewhere, the district result would represent nearly as incredible a flip-flop as that of 2008. If the DPP wins in every (emphasis on “every”) district in which it stands the slightest of realistic chances, it could emerge from the election with as many as forty out of seventy-three district seats. This would require as few as seventeen at-large seats or 50% of the total list vote to capture a majority.

Which of the above scenarios is the most likely? For this author, the most likely scenario is also the safest with which to go “on record.” At the end of the day, the odds are in favor of the KMT pulling off victories in about forty-three district races, four aboriginal seats, and about fourteen at-large seats totaling in the neighborhood of 61 seats, just short of a two-thirds majority. The DPP is likely to win about twenty-six district races, no aboriginal seats, and as many as sixteen at-large seats totaling about forty-two seats (more than double its share in 2008). The NPSU and PFP are likely to share among four district seats and two aboriginal seats, with the PFP possibly winning as many as three or four at-large seats. 
Based on its poor showing in 2008 and lackof district candidates, the prospects for the Taiwan Solidarity Union scoring the necessary 5% threshold in the at-large list are not good.

This project was conducted with the gracious research assistance of Ms. Ching-Hsuan (Christine) Meng (孟慶萱).

Hans Stockton (史漢傑), PhD, is the director of the Center for International Studies and
the Cullen Trust for Higher Education/Fayez Sarofim Endowed Chair in International Studies at the University of St. Thomas in Houston, Texas. He has studied Taiwan’s politics for more than twenty years and has observed every national election on Taiwan since 1992. He will be a member of an international delegation of election observers in Taiwan for the upcoming election.

Wednesday, December 28, 2011

強調主權獨立 陸委會駁國台辦

強調主權獨立 陸委會駁國台辦
2011/12/28 21:49:52  
(中央社記者陳虹瑾台北28日電)中國大陸國務院台灣 事務辦公室發言人楊毅今天指兩岸同屬一個國家;陸委 會今晚對此發出新聞稿表示,中華民國自1912年成立至 今,一直是主權獨立國家,大陸應務實面對。

楊毅今天在國台辦例行記者會上表示,兩岸不管是 過去、現在和將來,都不是「國與國」的關係,都同屬 於一個國家。

針對楊毅發言,行政院大陸委員會晚間指出,中華 民國是主權獨立的國家,大陸應該務實面對中華民國的 存在。

陸委會強調,中華民國自1912年成立至今,一直都 是主權獨立的國家,這是客觀存在的事實;總統馬英九 也多次表示,「中華民國是我們的國家,台灣是我們的 家園。」1001228

雲端技術供應商合併 加速創新

雲端技術供應商合併 加速創新
2011/12/28 17:26:42  
(中央社記者吳佳穎台北28日電)雲端優化技術服務供 應商Akamai宣布,要以約2.68億美元現金收購Cotendo ,預計明年上半年完成交易,Akamai並表示,雙方合併 可加速雲端和行動優化技術創新步調。

以智慧聯網分發技術CDN服務起家的Akamai,透過 在台公關公司發布消息表示,將併購雲端加速技術服務 供應商Cotendo。

由於Cotendo可提供一套整合的網站與行動加速服 務、加上夥伴關係可為Akamai帶來互補,Akamai樂以 2.68億美元現金收購Cotendo。

Akamai總裁兼執行長莎岡(Paul Sagan)表示,對 於能與Cotendo合併感到很興奮,Cotendo的技術、夥伴 關係與人才,為Akamai提供了強大的互補效益,開啟極 大的商機;雙方技術與團隊結合,可以加速雲端和行動 優化技術的創新步調。

Akamai表示,Cotendo是一家快速成長的雲端加速 技術創新公司,透過分佈全球的網路接點(points of presence; POPs)提供一套整合的網站與行動加速服務 。

Cotendo創立於2008年,總公司位於加州森尼韋爾 (Sunnyvale),在以色列設有技術中心,目前擁有約 100名員工,其中超過50人駐地在以色列;Cotendo客戶 包括Fortune 500大企業、第一線電信服務供應商和全 球最大社交網路、電子化商務網站、以及廣告網路等。

Cotendo提供的服務包括單一平台軟體包含動態網 站應用、靜態和動態網站內容加速服務、SSL、 Advanced DNS、調適性影像壓縮(Adaptive Image Compression)、效能監控和自動化失敗接管( failover)、以及即時報告和分析等。

Akamai表示,預期將在2012上半年完成交易, Akamai將以約2.68億美元現金取得所有流通在外 Cotendo股權,完成收購。1001228

Friday, December 23, 2011

追蹤耶誕老人 北美空軍待命

追蹤耶誕老人 北美空軍待命
2011/12/24 10:35:00


美國運輸部長拉胡德(Ray LaHood)透過聲明表示:「小精靈為耶誕老人一號加裝衛星科技,能確保耶誕老人平安、準時抵達所有的屋頂。」



NORAD發言人路易斯少校(Bill Lewis)指出,追蹤耶誕老人行蹤是NORAD季節性任務。「魯道夫的紅鼻子幫了追蹤工作很多忙;牠的鼻子是一大熱源。」

NORAD追蹤耶誕老人的傳統始自1955年。當年1份報紙廣告刊出聯繫耶誕老人的電話號碼,沒想到卻印錯成NORAD熱線。為了不讓小鬼頭們失望,當時負責NORAD任務的蕭普上校(Colonel Harry Shoup)下令用雷達探測耶誕老人行蹤,向孩子們報告。



OCA sends Holiday Greeting


Dear Friends:

It is our pleasure to send you this Holiday greeting as we come to the close of 2011. As we reflect on this past year, it is hard to believe all the wonderful accomplishments achieved in the last 12 months. With your faithful support and involvement, OCA as a national membership driven pan-Asian social justice organization continues to make strides in addressing issues of equity and equality which ranges from economic opportunities, education access, leadership development, and advocacy to strengthen our civil rights.

To this end, in reviewing some of our advocacy mandate, most recently, we are resolved to maintain efforts to champion for fair treatment of women and men in uniform, prompted by such cases as that of Lance Corporal Harry Lew and Private Danny Chen as well as upholding the Voting Rights Act in Texas. We are very grateful and inspired by the collaboration with our ground support of such exceptional Chapters as OCA-New York, OCA Houston, and the 50 others across the country and over 30 College Affiliates that we are proud to claim as our larger movement of APA political empowerment. We applaud the tireless work of our members and allies of all generations to right the wrong whether it is recent or distant. In this vein, we are particularly proud of the Greater Los Angeles Chapter successfully bringing FOX Sports to account for their comedy bit based on stereotypes of Asian college students as well as our victory in the Senate through the 1882 Project to winning support for a formal statement of regret for the Chinese Exclusion Act. These achievements demonstrate not only our collective will but our capacity for change and empowerment when our members, chapters, and allies are engaged.

It is in this spirit of pride and optimism that we also have been able to successfully produce two large-scale public programming: National Convention in New York and the Corporate Achievement Award in Washington DC. These events are platforms for us to connect with other like minded APAs to elevate the achievements of the movers and shakers in a variety of sectors.

We are able to continue to produce not only these special events but our high impact programming such as our APIA-U, B³ Leadership Summit, JACL-OCA National Leadership Conference, Mentoring Asian American Professionals (MAAP), and Scholarship Programs because of the support of individual donors and corporate sponsors. We also would like to take this opportunity to continue our tradition of thanking those who have supported not only our programs but those who have believed in our potential as an organization to support our organizational home in Washington DC…for those who have and continued to support the Building Fund, we are very, very grateful.

As we cast our hopes to the dawning of 2012, we are very excited to embark on another chapter. We certainly look forward to our National Convention in Las Vegas in August along with our Corporate Achievement Award in Washington DC. This year will be critical in paving the way for our 40
th Year Anniversary in 2013. In order to meet the growing demands of our national organization, we will be expanding our team in Washington DC to include a Development Manager and a Fellow for our civic engagement initiative: APA Engage! This reorganization will provide the necessary staffing as we seek to maintain strategic focus and sustainability. Finally, but importantly, our Search Committee has been hard at work on making the hire of our Executive Director. The announcement of the appointment by our leadership will be forth coming in January before our National Board Meeting.

Our final thoughts at year end, is one of ardent gratitude and joy that comes with being a part of the larger family of OCA. It is truly an honor to serve along with you. We look forward to greater fulfillment in 2012.

Warmest regards,

Ken Lee                           Tom Hayashi
President                         Interim Executive Director

PS: It’s not too late to contribute to our year-end challenge; with your help we will be able to meet our challenge match to raise a total of $80,000. Every dollar you contributed will be matched until December 28th. Please contribute by visiting our website at

休士頓僑教中心於中華民國101年(2012年)元旦不開放 但上午10時中心前廣場將舉行升旗典禮

Culture Center of Taipei Economic & Cultural Office in Houston

一、西元2012年1月1日(星期日) 為中華民國101年元旦國定假 日,中心不開放,上午10時 於本中心前廣場舉辦升旗典 禮,歡迎僑胞踴躍參加。
二、2011年12月31日(星期六)開 放時間至下午3時。

休士頓華僑文教服務中心 敬啟


Culture Center of Taipei Economic & Cultural Office in Houston

本(100)年12月25日(星期日)美國耶誕節(Christmas Day),依規定本中心公休一日。


(Polar Bears International)

Thursday, December 22, 2011

致哀哈維爾 多國領袖聚布拉格

致哀哈維爾 多國領袖聚布拉格
2011/12/23 14:38:00
(法新社布拉格23日電)捷克自由象徵、後共產時代首位總統哈維爾(Vaclav Havel)本週辭世,享壽75歲,世界各國領袖今天齊聚布拉格,將與捷克全國上下一起送哈維爾最後一程。

法國總統沙柯吉(Nicolas Sarkozy)、英國首相卡麥隆(David Cameron)和美國國務卿希拉蕊‧柯林頓(Hillary Clinton)等國際政要名列出席國葬官方名單之首,葬禮在布拉格城堡(Prague Castle)舉行。

捷克官方告別式將於格林威治時間1030左右展開,哀悼者齊聚布拉格城堡聖維特大教堂(Saint Vitus Cathedral)。



捷克總統克勞斯(Vaclav Klaus)、外交部長施瓦茲柏格(Karel Schwarzenberg)和捷克出生的前美國國務卿歐布萊特(Madeleine Albright)預定在葬禮上致詞。



駭客搭金正日死訊 伊妹兒藏毒

駭客搭金正日死訊 伊妹兒藏毒
2011/12/22 19:18:31  
(中央社記者吳佳穎台北22日電)北韓領導人金正日死訊 在12月19日正式由北韓官方發布後,隔天就成為網路犯 罪者利用散播惡意程式的工具,主要透過垃圾電子郵件 散布。

趨勢科技研究人員表示,近來發現一封主旨為金正 日死訊的垃圾郵件,其內文刻意註記為來自CNN報導的 字樣,並附有一個pdf檔案,打開檔案後會顯示一張金 正日的照片,以降低收件人的警覺心,以為開啟一個正 常檔案,實際上已經被植入一個名為TROJ_PIDIEF.EGQ 的惡意程式,為網路犯罪者開啟遠端遙控使用者電腦的 大門。

趨勢科技表示,一旦使用者不察,被植入惡意程式 ,網路犯罪者將透過遠端遙控,將受駭者電腦加入殭屍 網路大軍的一員,除了成為發送垃圾郵件的跳板,並可 能有機密資料外洩而不自知;此惡意程式會用 CVE-2010-2883 及CVE-2011-0611漏洞攻擊Adobe Reader和Acrobat,藉以散播更多的惡意程式。

趨勢科技資深技術顧問簡勝財表示,名人死訊會在 短時間內吸引全球注意,透過此類社交工程手法的惡意 攻擊已為常態,使用者除了更新相關系統漏洞外,對來 路不明的郵件不要輕易點選;網路上搜尋熱門新聞時, 也建議直接至具公信力的新聞相關網站觀看。1001222

新世紀人壽保險公司總裁陳舜哲博士率領工作人員與國際保健公司亞洲商務總裁王秀姿功同發佈新潮流健康計畫 為第一個可給付保戶在台灣的醫療費用之美國健康保險計畫(上)

到時會有更詳細解說及資料 還有茶點招待 
如有相關疑問 請電洽
Lisa Wang 281-368-7257

總統候選人政見會 23日首播

總統候選人政見會 23日首播
2011/12/22 17:44:00




赴美免簽 外交部預估1年後

赴美免簽 外交部預估1年後
2011/12/22 19:10:00
美國在台協會台北辦事處宣布將台灣列為免簽證計畫候選國,外交部長楊進添22日召開記者會,預估在明年下半年可達成與美國簽署免簽待遇協定。(中央社記者裴禛攝 100年12月22日)
美國在台協會台北辦事處宣布將台灣列為免簽證計畫候選國,外交部長楊進添22日召開記者會,預估在明年下半年可達成與美國簽署免簽待遇協定。(中央社記者裴禛攝 100年12月22日)
(中央社記者陳培煌台北22日電)外交部長楊進添今天說,美國在台協會(American Institute in Taiwan, AIT)下午宣布台灣獲美國國務院提名為免簽證計畫(VWP)候選國,他保守預估明年下半年能正式加入VWP。

AIT下午宣布台灣為美國免簽證計畫(Visa Waiver Program, VWP)候選國;楊進添在外交部例行記者會表示,「這是很好的聖誕禮物吧」。






休士頓僑教中心舉行年終志工人員聚餐 即將榮調之經文處長陳方正僑教中心副主任李偉農也到場與大家歡聚 志工聯誼外也交換工作心得

駐休士頓台北經濟文化辦事處新聞組舉行年終媒體聚會 處長陳方正及新聞組長齊永強與地區華文媒體人員歡聚


Wednesday, December 21, 2011

休士頓台灣大學校友會第34屆年會宣布 購票請洽理事群或電郵校友會

休士頓台灣大學校友會 三十四屆年會

Saturday, February 4th, 2012 5:00 PM 入席 6:00 PM 晚宴 
OceanPalace(珍寶樓) 11215BellaireBlvd77072
校友: $30.00 學生 : $20.00 Attire: Semiformal 

請向理事們購票或 電郵校友會

敏 (Grace Hu) 281-486-4344 
哈吉利瑪 (Chi-Li-Ma Harnold) 832-618-5819
葛家豪 (Chia Hao Ko) 832-677-2888 
林婉珍 (Fiona Kuang) 832-541-9655
嚴以聖 (Gloria Yen) 281-778-5983 
吳米崧 (Mason Wu) 281-565-4212
錢莉 (Chien Lee) 713-443-9088 
林 恂 (Francoise Shih) 713-745-0883
高瑜璞 (Grace Kao) 281-565-3688 
鄧嘉陵 (Aileen Teng) 832-526-7373 
劉修齊 (Rosa Lin ) 832-567-9499
陳著釧 (Rosa Hsu) 713-882-1458 

十道精緻可口的中國菜 * 餘興及抽獎

Tuesday, December 20, 2011

美南國建會舉行年度餐會 經文處處長陳方正僑教中心主任李偉農經文處科技組長周家蓓組員莊維明文化組長吳少芬新到任秘書李世屏與多位前任會長到場與大家同樂




恆豐銀行吳文龍董事長及總經理張永男分別在12月17日晚洲際大飯店員工聖誕 餐會上,歡迎所有的貴賓、股東及員工們,2011年將是恆豐銀行在歷史上很特殊 的一年,今年我們從FDIC手中收購了國際第一銀行,同時也將版圖從德州拓展到 內華達州,另外銀行主管機構及路易斯安納州也批准了新紐奧良分行,預計明年 5月我們可以設立,同時今年的稅前盈餘將可達到5千5百萬元,這是恆豐銀行從 1998年開行以來最好的成績,今年的財政部檢查、稽查人員,對本行的資產管理 人員素質、董事會的功能及處理不良資產的能力十分讚賞。

在12月10日的明年度 策略討論會上,對今年各項工作一一檢討,基本上各項業務均能按計畫實行,對 2012年的營運方針及策略也一一釐定。明年,銀行將盡全力處理國際第一銀行的 不良資產,減少不必要費用的支出,並確定所有營運系統能平順運轉,吳董事長 及張總經理並在會上感謝所有的銀行客戶,謝謝他們的支持及愛護,所有員工的 努力及所有股東的投資,吳董事長同時宣布在昨天的董事會上通過2012年的現金 股利-每股$0.50元,張總經理特別說明所有這些成就都歸功於我們有一個良好領導 人加上各位董事的指導,所有員工的努力,才能達成這麼輝煌的目標,今年董事 會宣布所有員工的紅利是每人9個星期,另對此次銀行併購有關人員,將多加一個 星期的紅利。

最後,恆豐銀行恭賀所有的客戶、股東、員工聖誕快樂、新年吉祥、事業順利、 龍年發大財。